Wednesday, 29 April 2015

इतिहास से क्यों हो छेड़छाड़ @मनोज मिश्र

इतिहास मुर्दागाड़ी नहीं होता, जिस पर व्यक्तिगत क्षुद्रताओं और सियासी रंजिशों के शव ढोए जाएं। इतिहास अतीत से सबक लेकर भविष्य के निर्माण का आख्यान है। लेकिन, दुर्भाग्य से इतिहास को इस दृष्टि से देखना बंद कर दिया गया है। हाल के दिनों में, इतिहास के नायकों को आमने-सामने कर एक को महिमामंडित करने और दूसरे को नीचे गिराने की प्रवृत्ति तेजी से पनपी है। इस षड्यंत्रकारी प्रवृति के सबसे ज्यादा शिकार जवाहरलाल नेहरू हो रहे हैं।


पहले पटेल की बात करें। उन्होंने खुले मन से जवाहर लाल नेहरू को अपना नेता स्वीकार किया था। बात अगर पटेल के बतौर गृह मंत्री सख्त रवैया अपनाकर तमाम राजे-रजवाड़ों को भारत में शामिल करने की है, तो वाकई इसका श्रेय उन्हें दिया जाना चाहिए। दिया जाता भी है। मगर इससे नेहरू उनसे कमतर कैसे साबित हो जाते हैं? क्या इस तथ्य की उपेक्षा की जा सकती है कि देश को बनाने और तमाम लोकतांत्रिक संस्थाओं की नींव रखने में इस शख्स का अहम योगदान रहा है?

लेकिन यहां हमें यह भी याद रखना होगा कि नेहरू भी हाड़-मांस के साधारण मनुष्य ही थे। इसलिए निर्णय लेने में उनसे कभी-कभी गलतियां होना स्वाभाविक है। जम्मू-कश्मीर के मसले पर नेहरू के नरम रवैये को लेकर उनकी आलोचना करने वाले लोग संभवतः इस तथ्य को भूल जाते हैं। इसी तरह, नेहरू के विरोधी आलोचना के लिए कई बार उनका सिगरेट पीते हुए फोटो सामने रखते हैं, तो कई बार माउंटबेटन की पत्नी के साथ उनके रागात्मक संबंधों की बात उठाते हैं। सवाल है कि नेहरू का मूल्यांकन उनके सामाजिक योगदान से किया जाना चाहिए या फिर उनके व्यक्तिगत जीवन से।

पटेल की ही तरह सुभाष चंद्र बोस की महानता भी असंदिग्ध है। आईसीएस का इम्तहान पास करने के बावजूद अफसरशाही का मोह त्याग देना, कांग्रेस में सक्रियता दिखाना और शीर्ष तक पहुंचना, फिर देश से बाहर जाकर तमाम विपरीत परिस्थितियों से जूझते हुए आजाद हिंद फौज का निर्माण करना- ऐसे काम हैं, जो किसी काल्पनिक गाथा सरीखे लगते हैं। लेकिन यहां भी सवाल वही है कि क्या इससे नेहरू छोटे हो जाते हैं? महानता का क्या कोई निश्चित पैमाना होता है?

आज अगर यह कहा जा रहा है कि नेहरू ने सुभाष चंद्र बोस के परिजनों की जासूसी कराई थी और इसके मंतव्यों का पता लगाने के लिए एक कमेटी का गठन किया जा रहा है, तो इसके पीछे की मंशा पर सवाल उठना लाजिमी है। पहला सवाल तो यही है कि सुभाष चंद्र बोस अगर हवाई दुर्घटना में नहीं मारे गए, तो आजादी के बाद उन्हें देश के सामने आने में दिक्कत क्या थी। कहा जाता है कि उनकी जान को खतरा था। ऐसा कहने वाले नेहरू की ओर संकेत करते हैं। हम कैसे भूल सकते हैं कि नेहरू के प्रधानमंत्रित्व काल में उनके तमाम विरोधी सक्रिय थे और बेहिचक अपनी बात लोगों के सामने रख रहे थे। कई वैचारिक विरोधियों को तो नेहरू ने मंत्रिमंडल में भी स्थान दिया था। ऐसा शख्स बोस को राजनीतिक बिरादरी में स्थान क्यों नहीं देता? लिहाजा कहीं इस सारे हंगामे के पीछे पश्चिम बंगाल के आने वाले विधानसभा चुनाव तो नहीं हैं? पश्चिम बंगाल के लोगों के बोस के प्रति भावनात्मक लगाव को देखते हुए कहीं राजनीतिक रोटियां तो नहीं सेंकी जा रही हैं? जो लोग ऐसा कर रहे हैं, उन्हें याद रखना चाहिए कि हर वर्तमान का इतिहास हो जाना नियति है, और इतिहास का मूल्यांकन बेहद निर्मम होता है

Tuesday, 28 April 2015

BOOK EXCERPT Miss Use: titillation on Bhojpuri music album covers @Vishal Rawlley

Miss Use: titillation on Bhojpuri music album covers
Photo Credit: -
An excerpt from a book of essays on the everyday and exceptional worlds of Indian popular and visual culture.
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The raunchy Bhojpuri music album arrived as a shocking phenomenon. The risqué song titles and audacious album art were blatantly perverse. The songs, in rustic folk woman voices, proclaimed forbidden desire.

Bordering on the vulgar and defiantly crass, these albums escaped being x-rated by crudely concealing their frank sexual expression in double entendres and suggestive imagery.

It all began with “cassette culture” (a term attributed to ethnomusicologist Peter Manuel) in the 1980s: cheap and portable audio cassettes and players made recorded music a mass culture. A number of small recording companies sprang up, publishing local content catering to regional markets. By the 1990s, music labels, large and small, were publishing a flood of regional titles catering not only to the vast hinterland audience, but also, increasingly, to the growing market of migrant populations in the cities.



In the early 1990s, as the Indian economy opened to the world, bringing sudden prosperity to the urban regions of the country. This led to a spurt in migrations from the hinterland. The number of workers from Bhojpuri-speaking regions (Bihar and Uttar Pradesh) swelled in the rapidly growing urban centres, as they searched for employment opportunities.

Mostly comprised of young males, discovering new liberties in the city, away from their homes and families, they became the prime target audience for the Bhojpuri music industry. 

Of the vast folk repertoire, it was the songs of love, longing and desire that became the popular city genre. This spawned a series of titles, and religious fault lines. Urban migration has broken down some of these old divides while establishing new class associations and edifying certain gender stereotypes. The effect of mass media and pop-culture on regional media and the reverse impact of vernacular expressive forms on the urban ethos can both be gleaned from examining the transitions in the Bhojpuri album over the two decades from the 1980s to the 2000s.



The cover girl: Miss Use

The raunchy Bhojpuri albums invariably feature a provocative figure of a desirable lady on the cover. Over a period of two decades (1980s to the 2000s), the image of this sexualised woman underwent several transitions, each phase marking a staggering shift from a regional culture to an urban sub-culture.

The “cover girl” started out as a voluptuous village belle and has now transitioned into a sexy urban chick. The cover image, initially a photo-realistic illustration, is now a digital photo collage. Earlier the “cover girl” carried an earthen pot; now she cradles a mobile phone. Once coy and bashful, she now wears a daring and taunting look.



Over the years, the cover girl has been variously styled and designed to titillate. Her portrayal has been constantly re-purposed to suit the changing tastes and shifting ethos. The cover girl can hence be aptly labelled as “Miss Use” – a title borrowed from a Bhojpuri album which hints at the much used, abused and misused portrayal of the Miss.

Excerpted with permission from Visual Homes, Image Worlds: Essays from Tasveer Ghar, edited by Christine Brosius, Sumathi Ramaswamy, Yousuf Saeed, Yoda Press. 

पटेल और बोस के तल्‍ख रिश्ते @रामचंद्र गुहा

मई 2014 के चुनाव से पहले भाजपा समर्थकों ने जवाहरलाल नेहरू पर हमला करने के लिए वल्लभभाई पटेल के नाम का उपयोग किया था। इसी मंशा के साथ हाल ही में उन्होंने जिस नए हथियार का इस्तेमाल किया, वह है, सुभाष चंद्र बोस की विरासत। इससे वैचारिक निरंतरता के साथ-साथ ऐतिहासिक सटीकता पर भी सवाल खड़े होते हैं। मगर सबसे बड़ा सवाल है कि क्या नेहरू को कमतर दिखाने के लिए पटेल और बोस दोनों को एक ही खांचे में रखा जा सकता है? ऐतिहासिक प्रमाणों की अनदेखी करके ही ऐसा करना मुमकिन होगा। दरअसल, वल्लभभाई पटेल के सुभाष बोस के साथ रिश्तों में तनाव ज्यादा था। 1933 में वल्लभभाई के बड़े भाई विट्ठलभाई के निधन के बाद तो यह तनाव और भी ज्यादा बढ़ गया। अपने आखिरी दिनों में विट्ठल भाई की देखभाल के लिए सुभाष उनके साथ थे। अपनी वसीयत में अग्रज पटेल ने अपनी तीन-चौथाई संपत्ति बोस के नाम की, ताकि उसका उपयोग दूसरे देशों में भारत के प्रचार के लिए किया जा सके। वल्‍लभभाई ने इस वसीयत की प्रामाणिकता पर सवाल उठाए। लंबे चले मुकदमे में वल्लभभाई को जीत मिली, और सारा पैसा सुभाष के बजाय विट्ठलभाई के नातेदारों को मिल गया।


उसके पांच वर्ष बाद वल्‍लभभाई ने कांग्रेस अध्यक्ष के तौर पर बोस का नाम प्रस्तावित करने के गांधी के फैसले का विरोध किया। पर गांधी ने इस पर कोई तवज्जो नहीं दी, और बोस कांग्रेस अध्यक्ष बने। 1939 में जब दूसरी बार बोस के अध्यक्ष बनने की बात आई, तब पटेल ने फिर इसका विरोध किया। उस वक्त सार्वजनिक तौर पर उन्होंने बोस को चेतावनी दी थी कि अगर उन्हें चुना जाता है, तो उनकी नीतियों की जांच होगी, और जरूरत पड़ने पर उस पर वर्किंग कमिटी (जिसमें पटेल के वफादार ज्यादा थे) वीटो करेगी।

जैसा कि वल्लभभाई की जीवनी लिखते वक्त राजमोहन गांधी उल्लेख करते हैं, 'उन्हें सुभाष की क्षमता पर संदेह था। इसके अलावा सुभाष के साथ उनके तमाम मतभेद भी थे।' पटेल चाहते थे कि 1937 में चुनी गई कांग्रेस सरकारें अपना काम जारी रखें, जबकि बोस की इच्छा यह थी, 'सभी सरकारें पदत्याग करके अंग्रेजों के खिलाफ संघर्ष में शामिल हो जाएं। पटेल ऐसे कदम को बेबुनियाद और मूर्खतापूर्ण मानते थे।' राजमोहन जिक्र करते हैं, 'दूसरा मतभेद गांधी पर था, जिन्हें सुभाष गैर-जरूरी, मगर सरदार पटेल बेहद अहम मानते थे।'

जब सुभाष ने वरिष्ठ कांग्रेसी नेताओं से अपने पुनर्निर्वाचन का समर्थन करने को कहा, तब पटेल हैरत में पड़ गए। उन्होंने राजेंद्र प्रसाद को लिखा, 'मैंने सपने में भी नहीं सोचा था कि वह (सुभाष) अपने पुनर्निवाचन के लिए इस हद तक नीचे गिरेंगे।' सुगत बोस अपनी किताब हिज मैजेस्टी'स अपोनेंट में पटेल के इस कथन का हवाला देते हैं, 'सुभाष का फिर से चुना जाना देश के लिए नुकसानदायक होगा।' जवाब में, सुभाष्‍ा ने आरोप लगाया कि वल्लभभाई उन्हें दोबारा चुनाव लड़ने से रोकने के लिए 'नैतिक दबाव' बना रहे हैं।

फिर जैसा कि सभी जानते हैं, पटेल और गांधी के विरोध के बावजूद पट्टाभि सीतारमैया को हराते हुए बोस ने फिर से चुनाव जीता। कांग्रेस के बड़े नेताओं के लिए यह बेहद शर्मनाक स्थिति थी। ऐसे में, पटेल ने राजेंद्र प्रसाद को लिखा, 'सुभाष्‍ा के साथ काम करना हमारे लिए नामुमकिन है।' गांधी-पटेल खेमा बतौर अध्यक्ष बोस की शक्तियों को कमजोर करते हुए उन पर पहले इस पद से, और फिर पार्टी से इस्तीफा देने का दबाव बनाने लगा।

दोनों के बीच के इस तकरार पर राजमोहन गांधी द्वारा किया गया शानदार शोध पटेल और बोस के बीच की इस कड़वाहट को स्पष्ट करता है। राजमोहन उल्लेख करते हैं, 'ऐसा लगता था मानो, बोस के समर्थकों की सारी नफरत पटेल तक सीमित थी, हालांकि सुभाष को लेकर गांधी का रुख कुछ नर्म था। बोस के भाई शरत ने पटेल पर आरोप लगाया था कि वह सुभाष के खिलाफ एक घटिया, द्वेषपूर्ण और बदला लेने से प्रेरित प्रचार अभियान छेड़े हुए हैं।

पटेल कहां पीछे रहने वाले थे? जब बोस ने उन्हें 'अलोकतांत्रिक' कहा, तब अपनी नाराजगी जाहिर करते हुए वह बोले, 'शेर जंगल में चुनाव के जरिये नहीं, बल्कि जन्म से ही राजा होता है।' राजमोहन यह टिप्पणी करते हैं, 'बाद में दिखाए गए सुभाष के साहस के बावजूद यह कहना होगा कि ऐसी अभद्र टीका-टिप्पणियां बिल्कुल नामुनासिब थीं। मगर 1939 में कांग्रेस के अंदरूनी संघर्ष के मद्देनजर इन हालात को समझा जा सकता था।'

इसके कई वर्षों बाद 1946 में इंडियन नेशनल आर्मी के सदस्यों की देश वापसी के वक्त पटेल ने उनका साथ देकर, दोनों पक्षों के बीच चली आ रही कटुता की कुछ हद तक क्षतिपूर्ति की। राजमोहन ऐसा करना उनकी मजबूरी मानते हैं, क्योंकि उस वक्त सुभाष लोगों के दिल-ओ-दिमाग पर पूरी तरह छाए हुए थे। इसी वजह से निर्वासन काल में दिखाई गई बहादुरी के लिए पटेल ने सुभाष की प्रशंसा भी की।

राजनीतिक असहमतियों से इतर पटेल और बोस के बीच विचारधारा से जुड़े मतभेद भी थे। बोस सामाजिक नियोजन पर बेहद भरोसा करते थे, जबकि पटेल का झुकाव निजी उद्यमों की ओर था। हिंदू-मुसलमान सौहार्द को लेकर पटेल की तुलना में सुभाष कहीं ज्यादा प्रतिबद्ध थे। 1935 में पहली बार प्रकाशित होने वाली अपनी किताब द इंडियन स्ट्रगल में सुभाष ने हिंदू महासभा की कड़ी आलोचना की थी। उन्होंने लगातार इसे प्रतिक्रियावादी कहकर पुकारा। वह इसमें इस्लामी कट्टरता की छवि देखते थे। दरअसल, जिस हिंदू-मुस्लिम एकता को गांधी और खुद सुभाष जरूरी मानते थे, उसे कमजोर करके, बकौल सुभाष, 'हिंदू महासभा अंग्रेजों के हाथों की कठपुतली बनी हुई है।'

बोस लिखते हैं, 'मुस्लिम लीग की भांति हिंदू महासभा न केवल पुरातन राष्ट्रवादियों से, बल्कि ऐसे लोगों से मिलकर बनी थी, जो राजनीतिक आंदोलन में शरीक होने से घबराते हैं, और खुद के लिए एक सुरक्षित मंच भी चाहते थे।' इस तर्क में वजन भी था। बोस, नेहरू और पटेल के ठीक उलट, जिनमें से हर एक ने तमाम वर्ष जेल में बिताए, 1930 और 40 के दशक के हिंदुत्ववादियों ने अंग्रेजों के विरोध में कोई कदम नहीं उठाने का फैसला किया था। इन्हीं में से एक जनसंघ के संस्‍थापक और भाजपा के आइकन डॉ. श्यामा प्रसाद मुखर्जी भी थे।

मुस्लिम लीग की विचारधारा की तरह हिंदुत्व की विचारधारा भी धार्मिक हठधर्मिता को सत्य पर तरजीह देती है। मगर पिछले कुछ दिनों में जो हुआ, वह वाकई हैरत में डालने वाला है। नियोजन और धर्मनिरपेक्षता के मुद्दों पर बोस और नेहरू को एक साथ देखा जा सकता है। इसी तरह, गांधी के प्रति झुकाव और इस विचार को लेकर कि दूसरे विश्वयुद्ध में धुरी शक्तियां, मित्र राष्ट्रों की तुलना में ज्यादा बुरी थीं, नेहरू और पटेल की सोच एक जैसी थी। मगर भारत को स्वतंत्र देखने की इच्छा को छोड़कर राजनीतिक, निजी या विचारधारा के मोर्चे पर बोस और पटेल में कुछ भी समानता नहीं थी।

जो यह मानते हैं कि मुस्लिमों को देश के प्रति अपनी वफादारी साबित करने की जरूरत है, वे नेहरू पर हमला बोलने के लिए पटेल के कंधे का सहारा ले सकते हैं। वहीं, जिनका यह मानना है कि अंग्रेजों की तुलना में जापानी कम क्रूर उपनिवेशवादी थे, वे नेहरू के खिलाफ बोस को खड़ा कर सकते हैं। मगर नेहरू को कठघरे में खड़ा करने के लिए पटेल और बोस के नाम का एक साथ उपयोग करना, न केवल राजनीतिक अवसरवादिता है, बल्कि इससे भी बदतर, बौद्धिक दिवालियापन है

आधुनिक भारत के रहस्य : चीन ने भारत पर हमला क्यों किया? @राहुल कोटियाल

1962 में भारत-चीन युद्ध के बाद आज भी सीमा विवाद कमोबेश उसी स्थिति में है और यह रहस्य भी कि चीन ने भारत पर हमला क्यों किया था.
INDIAN MYSTERY New‘इंडियन डिफेन्स रिव्यू’ में 7 मार्च, 2015 को एक लेख छपा. यह लेख मेजर जनरल अफसिर करीम द्वारा लिखा गया है. इसमें उन्होंने भारत को चीन से होने वाले संभावित खतरों की ओर इशारा किया है. वे लिखते हैं, ‘अब समय आ गया है जब भारत को अपनी सैन्य क्षमताओं और नीतियों में सुधार करते हुए चीन को जवाब देने के लिए तैयार हो जाना चाहिए.’ यह लेख तब और भी ज्यादा प्रासंगिक लगता है जब आए दिन चीनी और भारतीय सैनिकों के बीच गोलीबारी की ख़बरें सुनने में आती है. लेकिन यदि भारत और चीन के राजनीतिक संबंधों को देखें तो स्थिति कुछ अलग नजर आती है. कुछ ही समय पहले चीन के राष्ट्रपति भारत का दौरा कर चुके हैं और चीन ने भारत में बड़े पूंजी निवेश में भी दिलचस्पी दिखाई है. प्रधानमंत्री मोदी भी जल्द ही चीन के दौरे पर निकलने वाले हैं. ऐसे में यदि आने वाले दिनों में चीन अचानक भारत पर हमला कर देता है तो यह सबके लिए बेहद चौंकाने वाली घटना होगी.
जवाहरलाल नेहरू ने दलाई लामा से यह भी कहा कि ‘सारी दुनिया मिलकर भी तिब्बत को आज़ाद नहीं करवा सकती जब तक कि चीन ही पूरी तरह से नष्ट न हो जाए.’
ऐसा ही कुछ 1962 में भी हुआ. उस वक्त भी हालात कमोबेश आज जैसे ही थे. सीमा पर जो क्षेत्र तब विवादास्पद थे वे आज भी वैसे ही हैं. तब भी कुछ सैन्य विशेषज्ञ चीन से संभावित खतरों के लिए चेतावनी दे रहे थे, जिन्हें तब भी नजरअंदाज किया जा रहा था. राजनीतिक यात्राएं और वार्ताएं तब भी जारी थीं. बल्कि उस दौर में तो ‘हिंदी-चीनी भाई-भाई’ जैसे नारे भी खूब गूंजा करते थे. लेकिन तभी चीन ने भारत पर आक्रमण कर दिया. इसीलिए 1962 का वह युद्ध आज तक एक रहस्य ही बनकर रह गया है.+
बीते पचास सालों में आई कई रिपोर्टों और किताबों के जरिये 1962 के युद्ध को समझने में थोड़ी बहुत मदद जरूर मिलती है. लेकिन पक्केतौर पर आज भी नहीं कहा जा सकता कि चीनी हमले की वजह क्या थी. इतिहासकार रामचंद्र गुहा ने अपनी प्रसिद्ध किताब ‘इंडिया आफ्टर गांधी’ में काफी विस्तार से उन परिस्तिथियों का जिक्र किया है जिनके चलते पंडित जवाहरलाल नेहरु और तत्कालीन चीनी प्रधानमंत्री चाऊ एन-लाइ की दोस्ती धीरे-धीरे फीकी पड़ी और अंततः दोनों देश युद्ध में उलझ गए.+
भारत और चीन के बीच तिब्बत का मसला कैसे आया
तिब्बत के धर्म गुरू 1956 में भारत की आधिकारिक यात्रा पर आए थे और माना जाता है इस यात्रा ने उनके और नेहरू के बीच समझ बढ़ाने में महत्वपूर्ण भूमिका निभाई
तिब्बत के धर्म गुरू 1956 में भारत की आधिकारिक यात्रा पर आए थे और माना जाता है इस यात्रा ने उनके और नेहरू के बीच समझ बढ़ाने में महत्वपूर्ण भूमिका निभाई
इन परिस्तिथियों की शुरुआत गुहा ने 1950 के दशक के तिब्बत से की है. तिब्बत में चीनी सैनिकों का हस्तक्षेप लगातार बढ़ रहा था. इसके विरोध में 1958 में पूर्वी तिब्बत के खम्पा लोगों ने सशत्र विद्रोह छेड़ दिया. शुरुआत में खम्पा लोगों को कुछ सफलता भी मिली लेकिन अंततः चीनी सैनिकों ने विद्रोहियों को समाप्त कर दिया. इसके बाद दलाई लामा को भी धमकियां मिलने लगीं. उन पर खतरा बढ़ गया था. ऐसे में उन्होंने भारत में शरण लेने का मन बनाया. भारत उन्हें शरण देने को तैयार हो गया. प्रधानमंत्री नेहरू से मिलकर दलाई लामा ने उन्हें खम्पा विद्रोह के बारे में जानकारी दी. नेहरू ने दलाई लामा को बताया कि भारत तिब्बत की आज़ादी के लिए चीन से युद्ध नहीं कर सकता. साथ ही नेहरू ने यह भी कहा कि ‘सारी दुनिया मिलकर भी तिब्बत को आज़ाद नहीं करवा सकती जब तक कि चीन ही पूरी तरह से नष्ट न हो जाए.’+
1960 में नेहरू ने चाऊ एन लाई को भारत आने का न्योता दिया. इससे पहले जब 1956 में चीनी प्रधानमंत्री भारत आ चुके थे. तब उनका बड़ी गर्मजोशी से स्वागत किया गया था. लेकिन 1960 में हालात बिलकुल अलग थे
इस वक्त तक भारत और चीन के संबंध और कारणों से भी बिगड़ने लगे थे. इसी समय भारत सरकार को सूचनाएं मिलने लगीं कि चीन सीमा के नजदीक बड़े पैमाने पर सड़क निर्माण कर रहा है. जुलाई, 1958 में चीन की एक सरकारी पत्रिका ‘चाइना पिक्टोरिअल’  में कुछ विवादास्पद नक़्शे छापे गए. इन नक्शों में नेफा (नॉर्थ ईस्ट फ्रंटियर एजेंसी यानी आज का अरुणाचल प्रदेश) और लद्दाख के बड़े इलाके को चीन का हिस्सा दिखाया गया था. दिसंबर 1958 में जवाहरलाल नेहरू ने चीनी प्रधानमंत्री को इस संबंध में एक पत्र लिखा. इन नक्शों में जिस तरह से भारतीय इलाकों को चीन का हिस्सा दिखाया गया था उस पर नेहरू ने अपना विरोध दर्ज करते हुए लिखा था जब 1956 में उन दोनों की मुलाकात हुई थी तो चीनी प्रधानमंत्री ने मैकमोहन लाइन को स्वीकारते हुए मान्यता देने की बात कही थी. तब दोनों इस बात पर भी सहमत थे कि भारत और चीन के बीच कोई भी बड़ा सीमा विवाद नहीं है.+
भारत के प्रधानमंत्री को एक महीने बाद ही जवाबी पत्र मिल गया. जवाब में चाऊ इन लाइ ने कहा कि मैकमोहन लाइन ब्रितानी हुकूमत की विरासत है जिसे चीन कभी भी मान्यता नहीं दे सकता. साथ ही उन्होंने कहा कि भारत और चीन के बीच हमेशा से रहे सीमा विवाद को कभी सुलझाया नहीं गया था. 22 मार्च, 1959 को नेहरू ने एक और पत्र लिखकर इस बात के कई प्रमाण दिए कि चीनी नक्शों में दर्शाए गए इलाके दरअसल भारत के अभिन्न अंग हैं. साथ ही उन्होंने अपने इस पत्र में यह भी उम्मीद जताई कि जल्द ही दोनों देशों इन मसलों पर किसी सहमति पर पहुंच जाएंगे. नेहरू के इस पत्र का जवाब आ पाता उससे पहले ही दलाई लामा भारत आ गए.  यहां से भारत और चीन के रिश्ते और भी ज्यादा बिगड़ने लगे.  चीन ने आरोप लगाया कि भारत-चीन संबंधों को बिगाड़ने की पहल भारत की ओर से की जा रही है.+
भारतीय जनता का चीन के खिलाफ होना और सेना का असमंजस
इसी दौरान मुंबई में भी एक घटना हुई जिसके कारण चीन को भारत पर निशाना साधने के कुछ और कारण मिल गए. मुंबई स्थित चीनी महावाणिज्य दूतावास के कार्यालय की दीवार पर कुछ प्रदर्शनकारियों ने माओ त्से तुंग की तस्वीर टांगकर उस पर अंडे और टमाटर फेंके. चीन ने इस घटना पर नाराजगी जताते हुए चेतावनी दी कि यदि भारत इस घटना पर उचित कार्रवाई नहीं करता तो इसके परिणाम गंभीर हो सकते हैं.+
सेना के अधिकारियों के साथ जवाहरलाल नेहरू
सेना के अधिकारियों के साथ जवाहरलाल नेहरू
भारत-चीन सम्बन्ध जिस तेजी से सीमा पर बिगड़ रहे थे लगभग उसी गति से भारतीय जनता में भी चीन के खिलाफ माहौल बन रहा था. विपक्षी पार्टियों के दबाव में भारत सरकार ने सितंबर, 1959 को एक श्वेत पत्र जारी किया. इसमें पिछले पांच वर्षों में चीन से हुए पत्राचार का पूरा ब्यौरा था. इस श्वेतपत्र के सार्वजनिक होने से भारतीय जनता को चीन द्वारा सीमा पर की जा रही गतिविधियों की पूरी जानकारी मिल गई. रामचंद्र गुहा अपनी किताब में लिखते हैं, ‘यदि यह श्वेतपत्र जारी नहीं हुआ होता तो भारत-चीन सीमा विवाद को राजनीतिक या कूटनीतिक स्तर पर भी सुलझाया जा सकता था. लेकिन इनके सार्वजनिक होने के बाद जनता में चीन के प्रति आक्रोश था और तब राजनीतिक हल ढूंढना चीन के सामने घुटने टेकने जैसा हो गया था.’+
उस दौर में वीके कृष्णा मेनन केन्द्रीय रक्षा मंत्री थे. वे प्रधानमंत्री के काफी करीबी माने जाते थे. लेकिन तत्कालीन सेनाध्यक्ष जनरल केएस थिमैया से उनके सम्बन्ध अच्छे नहीं थे. जनरल थिमैया का मानना था कि उनकी सेना को चीन से होने वाले हमले के लिए तैयार रहना चाहिए. लेकिन रक्षामंत्री मेनन उनकी बात को नज़रंदाज़ करते रहे. मेनन को लगता था कि भारत को असल खतरा चीन से नहीं बल्कि पकिस्तान से है इसीलिए सेना का बड़ा हिस्सा पाकिस्तानी सीमाओं पर ही तैनात था. रक्षामंत्री और सेनाध्यक्ष के बीच यह तनाव आगे जा कर और बढ़ गया. अगस्त, 1959 में मेनन ने बीएम कौल नाम के एक अधिकारी को लेफ्टिनेंट जनरल नियुक्त कर दिया. कौल को इस पद पर लाने के लिए उनसे वरिष्ठ 12  अधिकारियों को नज़रंदाज़ किया गया था. जनरल थिमैया ने इसके विरोध में प्रधानमंत्री को अपना इस्तीफ़ा भेज दिया. हालांकि प्रधानमंत्री नेहरू ने जनरल थिमैया को इस्तीफ़ा देने से तो रोक लिया लेकिन इस घटना से सारे देश में रक्षामंत्री के खिलाफ माहौल बन गया. उन पर पहले से भी वामपंथी समर्थक होने के कारण चीन के प्रति सहानुभूति रखने के आरोप लगते रहते थे.+
कुछ लोगों का मानना है कि चीन इसलिए घबरा गया था कि अब वामपंथी पार्टियों समेत भारत की सभी विपक्षी पार्टियां सरकार के साथ एकजुट होकर चीन का विरोध कर रहीं थी
1959 में भी भारत-चीन सीमा पर दोनों सेनाओं के बीच झड़प की कई घटनाए हुईं. इस समय दोनों देशों के बीच पत्राचार भी लगातार चल रहा था. 1960 में नेहरू ने चाऊ एन लाई को भारत आने का न्योता दिया. इससे पहले जब 1956 में चीनी प्रधानमंत्री भारत आ चुके थे. तब उनका बड़ी गर्मजोशी से स्वागत किया गया था. लेकिन 1960 में हालात बिलकुल अलग थे. हिन्दू महासभा ने चाऊ एन लाई के विरोध में काले झंडे दिखाए. जहां 1956 में उनकी भारत यात्रा के दौरान ‘हिंदी-चीनी भाई भाई’ जैसे नारे दिए गए थे वहीं इस बार यह नारे बदलकर ‘हिंदी-चीनी बाय बाय’ हो चुके थे. चाऊ एन लाई की इस यात्रा के बाद भी भारत-चीन सीमा विवाद जस का तस ही बना रहा. दोनों देश इस यात्रा और बातचीत के बाद भी किसी सहमति तक नहीं पहुंच पाए.+
युद्ध की शुरुआत और अंत
1962 के मई-जून में अचानक सीमा पर गोलीबारी की घटनाएं बढ़ गईं. चीनी सेना की कई टुकड़ियां भारतीय सीमा के भीतर घुस आईं. भारतीय सेना के पास इनका मुकाबला करने के लिए न तो पर्याप्त हथियार थे और न ही सैनिक. युद्ध के बीच में ही जनरल कौल छाती में दर्द होने के कारण सीमा से लौट कर दिल्ली आ गए. बिना किसी नेतृत्व के सेना के जवान पांच दिनों तक लड़ते रहे जिसके बाद नेफा के तवांग के इलाके पर भी चीन कब्ज़ा हो गया. रक्षामंत्री मेनन को आखिरकार मंत्रिमंडल से निकाल दिया गया और भारत अब अमरीकी मदद लेने की दिशा में बढ़ने लगा.+
अब तक चीनी सैनिक नेफा में इतना आगे बढ़ चुके थे कि जल्द ही असम के भी उनके हाथ में जाने का खतरा पैदा हो गया. उधर दिल्ली और मुंबई के भर्ती केन्द्रों पर हजारों युवा सेना में भर्ती होने को तैयार थे. लेकिन 22 नवंबर को अचानक ही चीन ने युद्धविराम की घोषणा कर दी. इस युद्ध का अंत भी इसकी शुरुआत की ही तरह एक रहस्य था. नेफा में चीन ने अपने सैनिकों को मैकमोहन लाइन से पीछे कर लिया और लद्दाख क्षेत्र में भी वह उस स्थिति में वापस लौट गए जो युद्ध से पहले थी. चीन ने अचानक ही अपने सैनिकों को वापस बुलाकर युद्धविराम की घोषणा क्यों की? इस सवाल के जवाब में भी सिर्फ कयास ही लगाए जाते रहे हैं. कुछ लोगों का मानना है कि चीन इसलिए घबरा गया था कि अब वामपंथी पार्टियों समेत भारत की सभी विपक्षी पार्टियां सरकार के साथ एकजुट होकर चीन का विरोध कर रहीं थी. अमरीका और ब्रिटेन का भारत को समर्थन करना और हथियार भेजना भी एक कारण माना जाता है जिसने चीन को युद्धविराम पर मजबूर कर दिया था. वहीं एक तर्क यह भी दिया जाता रहा है कि सर्दियों में वह सारा इलाका बर्फ से ढक जाता है. ऐसे में चीन ज्यादा समय तक अपने सैनिकों को मदद नहीं पहुंचा सकता था इसलिए उसके पास लौट जाने का ही विकल्प बचा था.+
रामचंद्र गुहा के अनुसार, ‘इस युद्ध के अंत को तो फिर भी कुछ हद तक समझा जा सकता है लेकिन इसकी शुरुआत को समझना बेहद जटिल है. चीन की तरफ से कभी-भी कोई श्वेतपत्र जारी नहीं किया गया. लेकिन इस युद्ध के बारे में यह जरूर कहा जा सकता है कि इतने सुनियोजित आक्रमण के पीछे कई साल का अभ्यास रहा होगा. इस युद्ध का समय भी चीन के लिए बिलकुल सटीक था. उस वक्त विश्व की दोनों महाशक्तियां – सोवियत संघ व अमेरिका और इनके साथ ही संयुक्त राष्ट्र,  क्यूबा के मिसाइल संकट में उलझे हुए थे. इस कारण चीन को बिना किसी डर के कुछ दुस्साहसिक करने की छूट मिल गई थी.

India was Indira, Indira was India. July 2000 By Ramachandra Guha

25TH Anniverary of Emergency Rule
Mrs. Gandhi was not the matriarch unwillingly pushed to drastic action. She was inclined dictatorial, writes Ramachandra Guha.

Between June 1975 and January 1977, Indian democracy took an extended leave of absence. Under directions from prime minister Indira Gandhi, political opponents were jailed, human rights extinguished, news censored, and a personality cult of the Leader promoted. The "Emergency", as it is known, was once regarded as a defining moment in the history of independent India. After it was lifted, and Mrs. Gandhi dethroned, the Emergency experience was viewed as a "near miss", when India had narrowly failed to permanently join the well-subscribed ranks of the world's dictatorships. Political commentators alerted the citizenry to its lessons — not to allow bureaucrats and judges to ally with political parties, never to justify curbs on freedom of expression and, above all, to always put faith in process rather than personality.
This June marked the 25th anniversary of the declaration of national emergency by Indira Gandhi. One might have expected solemn and cautionary remembrance. Instead, recent events suggest that the Indian political class may be revising its views of the Emergency. The ruling coalition in Delhi is dominated by men who were once jailed by Mrs. Gandhi. Yet, this past January,   the  Government  of  India awarded the Padma Vibhushan — the   country's   second   highest honour — to one man who was Cabinet Secretary during the Emergency, and to another who, as High Commissioner to the United Kingdom between 1975 and 1977, enthusiastically spread false information about the situation at home. When the person who had been Indira Gandhi's Ambassador to the United States died in March, the obituaries respectfully marked the important milestones in his career without so much as mentioning his energies spent justifying the Emergency, in Washington. Service to the state, it seems, shall ultimately be rewarded regardless of the kind of service or, indeed, the kind of state.

Perhaps the most daring re-interpretation of the Emergency comes in a just-published book (Indira Gandhi, the Emergency and Indian Democracy, OUP, New Delhi, 2000) by Mrs. Gandhi's long-serving principal secretary, P. N. Dhar. The Emergency, we may recall, was promulgated after a High Court judge in Allahabad found the prime minister guilty of "electoral malpractices". An appeal to the Supreme Court could be made, but in the interim, the prime minister would have to vacate her post in favour of some other Member of Parliament from her party. The thought was abhorrent to Mrs. Gandhi's family and advisers—and to herself as well. An emergency had to be declared.

In P. N. Dhar's account, the Emergency was not really a consequence of Indira Gandhi's fear of losing her personal position. It was, rather, the outcome of a year-long agitation against corruption and mal-administration led by Jayaprakash Narayan, the veteran Gandhian. This agitation, in Dhar's interpretation, had undermined law and order, and spread anarchy and violence. Were one to reduce his argument to numbers, then it would appear that the responsibility for the declaration of Emergency was 90 percent Narayan's, 10 percent Mrs. Gandhi's.

Dhar does not deny the violations of human rights and the prevalence of state violence during Emergency. rule, but he determinedly draws the reader's attention to the simultaneous arrest of inflation. And, suggests Dhar, if Narayan was the one principally responsible for the Emergency, then it was the prime minister's second son Sanjay who was principally responsible for what went wrong during the Emergency. The harassment of slum dwellers and the forced sterilisations were the work of this son who held no official position. But the rise in foodgrain production and the checks on inflation were, one supposes, exclusively the work of the mother.

Narrow domestic walls

For a dictator, Indira Gandhi had a remarkably long and unique preparation in the school of democracy. On her 13th birthday, her father, then in prison, began writing her a series of letters, later published as Glimpses of World History. Starting with the Greeks, this wide-ranging tour took in the old Indian village republics, ancient Chinese kingdoms, the rise of monotheism and its associated political formations, Buddhism, the Mughals, and the Industrial Revolution (and much else besides). Jawaharlal Nehru was both an Indian patriot and a Western-trained socialist-democrat, for whom history unfolded as the oftinterrupted progress of the human animal towards greater sociability and freedom. The later letters explored how "democracy, which was for a century and more the ideal and inspiration of countless people, and which can count its martyrs by the thousands", was now "losing ground everywhere". The last letter, sent to Indira on 9 August 1933 — three years after the first —ended with this excerpt from Rabindranath Tagore's great poem, Gitanjali:

Where the mind is without fear and the head is held high; Where knowledge is free; Where the world has not been broken up into fragments by narrow domestic walls; Where words come out from the depth of truth; Where tireless striving stretches its arms towards perfection; Where the clear stream of reason has not lost its way into the dreary desert sand of dead habit; Where the mind is led forward by thee into ever-widening thought and action —

Into that heaven of freedom, my Father, let my country awake. Glimpses of World History sold briskly, and in time the author was persuaded by his publisher to bring out an expanded edition. A freshly written postscript, dated 14 November 1938, outlined the major political developments of the 1930s. "The growth of fascism during the last five years and its attack on every democratic principle and conception of freedom and civilisation," wrote Jawaharlal to Indira, "have made the defense of democracy the vital question today."

Later, in her adulthood, Indira Gandhi participated in five general elections in free India. All were won by the Congress party —thrice under her father's leadership, twice under hers. The odd reference here and there suggests that she did not unequivocally share Nehru's trust in the democratic process. In December 1949, she angrily protested to him for not interfering when lesser Congressmen took over the National Herald, a newspaper started by Jawaharlal and regarded by some as Nehru family property. "You tolerate a lot of things," she told her father sarcastically, "it makes one's heart bleed to hear everyone say that it is no use bringing anything to your notice since you don't do anything about righting things."

In 1956, Indira argued with him against allowing autonomy to regionally powerful (and respected) Congressmen in dealings with their states. She wrote, "You are tending more and more to accept without question, the opinions of certain people with regard to certain parts of the country." Most famously, as Congress president in 1959, she prevailed upon Nehru to implement a then never-used provision of the Constitution to dismiss the democratically-elected Communist government of Kerala,

The same year, while on a visit to Kenya, she spoke approvingly in public of one-party regimes. The Chinese invasion of October 1962 and the criticisms it spawned of Nehru and his government, seemed to have consolidated these feelings. In January 1963, she wrote to friend, complainingly, of "the price we pay for democracy [which] not only throws up the mediocre person but gives strength to the most vocal howsoever they may lack knowledge and understanding".

These reservations were to find full expression in the Emergency of 1975-77. One might damage the revisionist views now current by a careful reading of the social history of those years, by a documentation of democracy's destruction and the spread of terror, intimidation and violence. Instead, this essay seeks to set the record straight in the words of Mrs Gandhi herself, by demonstrating that the Indian prime minister was an actively willing dictator, not a reluctant one pushed by malevolent opponents and an unruly son. My main sources are Indira Gandhi's own words, as articulated in print, as well as in some private correspondence that has not been publicly available.

All Indira Radio

Mrs. Gandhi's singular contribution to Indian political discourse was the idea of the 'foreign hand'. The nationality of this hand is hard to establish, although one presumes it was coloured white. A week after the declaration of Emergency, the prime minister gave an interview to M. Shamim of The Times of India. "The aim of the opposition parties was obvious," she remarked, "[it was] to paralyse the government and indeed all national activity and thus walk to power over the 'body' of the nation. The situation had come to such a pass that a few more steps would have led to disintegration, which would have exposed us to foreign danger."

She returned to the theme in her speech of 11 November 1975, broadcast over what was now routinely referred to in private, as All Indira Radio. The prime minister told the nation that "there are many people outside the country who are not our well-wishers and who do not like to see India being strong and united and carrying forward its economic programmes. This was their desire and their efforts and our countrymen also got entrapped in the process."

Then, and afterwards, it was difficult to reliably identify these foreign ill-wishers. India's otherwise   most   dangerous neighbour, Pakistan, had recently been defeated on the battle-field, and was still to come to terms with the loss of its eastern wing. With Mao on his deathbed, neither was China in an  adventurist  mood. There was in place an Indo-Soviet Friendship Treaty which took care of the Russians. No European country had much of a stake, political or economic, in India. Was it the United States of America that Mrs. Gandhi had in mind? She would never clearly say, although her advisers and followers would occasionally speak of the dark doings of the Central Intelligence Agency.

This paranoid talk of interfering foreigners is best understood, perhaps, in the light of internal politics and the rapid fall in Mrs. Gandhi's own popularity. The decline had been dramatic. The year 1971 began with the sweeping victory of the Congress in the general elections and had ended with the decisive triumph over Pakistan in the Bangladesh war, a win in which more credit accrued to the prime minister than to her generals. She was now the elected Empress of India. Opposition politicians began comparing her to the all-powerful Hindu goddess, Durga, a comparison made permanent in a series of murals painted by a famous Muslim artist. No one dared predict how long her lawful reign might last, but then two bad monsoons supervened, and OPEC raised the price of crude oil. The scarcity of water and fuel was made more deadly by nepotism and graft. The prime minister's son, Sanjay, a half-trained mechanic with no proper qualifications for the task, started building a car factory with land and loans allotted at preferential rates by public institutions. Two crucial Congress-ruled states, Gujarat and Bihar, saw the unprecedented spread of official corruption.

The response to all this was the movement led by Jayaprakash Narayan, which quickly spread from his native Bihar to other parts of the country. Suddenly, the Empress looked vulnerable. Mrs. Gandhi's predicament, circa 1974-75, is comparable to the current situation of Robert Mugabe, the Zimbabwean president. Mugabe, too, started on a high, and at first climbed higher, but then drought, graft and nepotism gave rise to criticism. Mugabe's initial response to this was to concentrate power in his hands, by marginalising erstwhile comrades, much as Mrs. Gandhi had swiftly cut to size Congressmen who had enjoyed an independent source of moral or political authority. When the criticisms of his increasingly dictatorial rule intensified, Mugabe warned of conspiracies aided by Western powers. Like Mugabe today, in 1975 Mrs. Gandhi found it hard to understand how a previously adoring citizenry had begun to protest so. It was altogether more convenient to blame foreigners than to look for signs of flawed governance within.

During the Emergency, the Congress president D. K. Barooah coined the slogan "Indira is India, India is Indira". This equation of herself with the nation—or at any rate with the nation's best interests — was also often made by Mrs. Gandhi herself. The Emergency was declared, she claimed in her broadcast on 11 November 1975 , because:

we felt that the country has developed a disease and, if   is to be cured soon, it has to be given a dose of medicine, even if  it is a bitter dose. However dear a child may be, if the doctor has prescribed bitter pills for him, they have to be administered for his cure. The child may sometimes cry and we may have to say, 'Take the medicine, otherwise you will not get cured'. So, we gave this bitter medicine to the nation.

The doctor-matriarch continued: Now when a child suffers, the mother suffers too. Thus, we were not very pleased to take this step. We were also sad. We were also concerned. But we saw that it worked just as the dose of the doctor works.

The Indian dictator's mentality is also revealed in some previously unpublished correspondence with her English friends. The art historian and former Indian Civil Service officer, W.G. Archer had written to Mrs. Gandhi in December 1975 to congratulate her on her "bold action". She "must have been bitterly aggrieved," wrote Archer, "that many supposed 'friends of India' in this country had patently failed to understand or approve your action in declaring the Emergency." Now the prime minister was indeed cognisant of the general (and well-merited) opposition of the British intelligentsia to what she had done.

While some English politicians, such as Michael Foot, had offered unconditional support, the press was not so obliging. The Times carried a series of hostile reports, prompting the then Indian high commissioner —and this year's Padma Vibhushan awardee —to write a letter to the newspaper describing conditions in Indian jails: "The care and concern showered by the state authorities upon the welfare of the detenus who are well housed, well fed and well treated, is almost maternal." But the criticisms persisted. The December 1975 issue of the respected Encounter magazine printed a long essay sympathetic to Jayaprakash Narayan under the title "Indira Gandhi's Prisoner".

Jawaharlal Nehru's daughter could live more easily with American or Soviet disapproval. So she wrote back to W. G. Archer saying she was "touched" by "the understanding you show of the complex situation in our country". She continued: "India is not an easy country to know. Perhaps that is the reason why we irritate the Western world so much. The struggle here is not merely one of economic growth or even of social justice but of retaining our individuality and developing in our own way. Unfortunately most educated Indians are taken in by the glitter of the affluent countries and by their propaganda that their's is the best of all possible worlds."

One is struck by the resemblance here to sentiments expressed by the likes of Mobutu Sese Seko, Fidel Castro and Lee Kuan Yew, that is, by authoritarians of military, communist or any other provenance. These would reject human rights as a Western imposition, and homegrown defenders of those rights as Western agents. To that presumed universalism is offered the Singaporean or Cuban or Indian alternative of "retaining our individuality and developing in out own way", a way that does not admit of such irritants as freedom of speech and freedom of association.

In March 1976, Archer visited India and met Mrs Gandhi. His notes of the interview reveal a ruler whose resolve was mixed with a dangerous dose of paranoia. "I have to keep India together," she said to him. "That is an absolute must." "Total freedom (of the press and public opinion) will be fatal to India." Likewise, "total devolution [will] be fatal to India". And, notably, “the Emergency had made the state ministers shake in their shoes. This was long over-due..."

It is clear that there was no serious threat to the unity and integrity of India either before or during the Emergency. Was it that freedom of the press and public opinion would be fatal to India, or to Indira? In October 1976, the question was raised by the British columnist Bernard Levin in a two-part essay in The Times which focussed on press censorship and interference with the judiciary in India. "After studying a substantial amount of material on the subject," Levin concluded that, "Mrs. Gandhi's shabby little regime" definitely qualified for that definitive epithet, "totalitarian". He ended his essay by quoting the farewell editorial of the Bombay journal, Opinion: "The current Indira regime, founded on 25 June 1975, was born through lies, nurtured by lies, and flourishes by lies. The essential ingredient of its being is the lie."

The fall
The Emergency lasted for 20 months. In January 1977, to everyone's surprise, Mrs. Gandhi called elections. There are competing explanations as Jo why she did this. Back then, it was widely believed that Mrs. Gandhi's own trusted advisors in the Research and Analysis Wing had predicted a hands-down victory for her. In his book, P. N. Dhar speculates that Mrs. Gandhi wanted once more to hear the accolade of the people, to seek through the campaign trail the admiration and reverence that had so readily come her way in 1971. A third possibility is that Mrs. Gandhi was shamed by the example of Pakistan, then enjoying one of its all-too-rare periods of democratic rule.

When general elections were due in early 1976, Mrs. Gandhi had amended the Constitution to extend, by a year, the life of the Lower House —the Lok Sabha. Later, the Lok Sabha's life was extended by a further 12 months, until early 1978. Her advisers, and especially her son Sanjay, thought this process could be made to continue forever, and so it is not clear why Mrs. Gandhi decided to hold elections at all.

As it turned out, the Congress party was roundly defeated, and the prime minister and Sanjay both lost. Others saw her defeat as a commentary on authoritarianism and abuse of power. But for Mrs. Gandhi, it was time to unwrap, once more, the theory of the foreign hand. Thus the unseated dictator wrote to a relative that, "people have always thought  that I was imagining things or overreacting but there has been a deep conspiracy and it was bound to overtake us". Or, as she helpfully explained to a foreign interviewer, "they had a lot of money to spend... Some sections in the Janata party had the support of the Western press, Amnesty International and other Western organisations. Another section was supported by the Soviets."

Mrs. Gandhi was now out of power, but the condemnation of the Emergency persisted. In The Guardian of 16 November 1978, E. P. Thompson, the British radical of the Left, recalled a visit to New Delhi in the winter of 1976-77. The prime minister personally received the gift Thompson was carrying —copies of letters written by her father to him — but Thompson came away convinced him that Mrs. Gandhi and Sanjay had unfairly confiscated and abused the good name of Jawaharlal Nehru. In his essay, Thompson wrote with feeling of how, despite spending years in British jails, Nehru could still befriend Englishmen: "One would have to go rather far back in British history to find an article of that quality: to find persons willing to undergo years of imprisonment, and to emerge with unflagging intellectual vitality and with so little bitterness." This was a civilised human being and, as his years in office showed, a democrat besides. During the Emergency, Mrs. Gandhi and her son were teaching the Indian people to turn their backs on "the best traditions of Congress and of Nehru".

Retrospective defense

Mrs Gandhi had certainly read Bernard Levin, in October 1976, and it is likely that, two years later, she read E. P. Thompson too. Like other Indians of her class and generation, she respected both The Times and The Guardian, the one the voice of the British Establishment, the other the vehicle of progressive, anti-imperial, and generally, pro-Indian sentiment. But their barbs were nothing to the one that came her way in October 1981.

The Emergency was now a distant memory, and the person who brought it about was now back in office, after being two-and-a-half years out of power. Mrs. Gandhi saw, or was perhaps alerted to, an item in the British Press which claimed that Lord Louis Mountbatten, the viceroy who had so gracefully brought down the Union Jack back in August 1947, refused to visit India between 1975 and 1977 as it was then a "police state". Mountbatten was dead, so the Indian prime minister instead addressed her complaint to his son-in-law, Lord Brabourne. "During the emergency," wrote Mrs. Gandhi to the English family whose approval she most sought, "some people were arrested, some were politicians but the larger number were what we call anti-social elements —smugglers, dacoits, hoarders, black-marketeers, etc., whose activities had been pushing up our prices, creating shortages and were generally harmful to the people as a whole. Not once during [the] emergency was there any show of police strength. We ourselves released all political prisoners some time before the 1977 elections. When the Janata Party came to power, it released the criminals, with dire consequences from which we have not yet recovered."

This was an illustration of euphemistic lying, characteristic of dictators and dictatorial regimes. It was a language that came naturally to Mrs Gandhi. In a broadcast of 27 June 1975 that first justified the Emergency to the nation, she had said that "the purpose of censorship is to restore a climate of trust". In August of that year, with all her political opponents locked up in jail, fundamental rights extinguished and the media censored, she informed the American journalist Norman Cousins during a visit to the United States that "what has been done is not an abrogation of democracy but an effort to safeguard it". In a televised discussion on this trip to the USA, she magisterially announced that "people are already being released almost every day". A little later, she told a Bombay weekly that "there is no use of force and... there is no show of force anywhere in the country. The truth is that the police have had less work since the Emergency than ever before."

In the last week of 1975, alerting a conference of lawyers to some impending amendments to the Constitution, Mrs. Gandhi remarked that "if any change is required, it will be not to lessen democracy but to give more meaning to democracy, to keep democracy, to make it a more living democracy." Such gems, carefully culled from their boss's speeches by a craven high commissioner and his staff, were printed on art paper by an expensive London studio and presented to the world in a pamphlet with the title: "Democracy Preserved: Facts about the Emergency in India".

More notable than Mrs. Gandhi's attitude while the Emergency was on, was her retrospective defense of it. This, as the comments to Lord Brabourne suggest, was total. Consider also Volume III of Indira Gandhi's Selected Speeches and Writings, issued by the Publications Division of the Government of India in October 1984, the very month she fell to assassins' bullets. At the heart of the book is the reproduction of a series of speeches delivered and interviews undertaken during and in defence of the Emergency. Their republication in 1984, we may be assured, was approved by Mrs. Gandhi herself.

Consider, finally, an excerpt from an interview given in July 1978 to the American writer Mary Carras. During the Emergency, said Mrs. Gandhi, "We built our foreign-exchange reserves, and we were beginning to make a go of the public sector. Production had gone up and corruption had come down, and everything was going much more smoothly... During the first year of the Emergency, everyone (except the smugglers) asked why we hadn't done it earlier."

A large number of smugglers must have been granted the vote in the elections of March 1977. That is one explanation for her defeat. Or perhaps we should set against the dictator's defence the pithy remark of an Indian jurist that the Emergency was a "fraud on the president, a fraud on the Council of Ministers and a fraud on the people". But the fairest comment on Indira Gandhi's Emergency was reported by A. M. Rosenthal of The New York Times, who had served as his paper's correspondent in India. Rosenthal, like E. P. Thompson, would underline the contrast between the democratic Nehru and his dictatorial daughter. Visiting New Delhi in late 1975, he was told of a grim joke doing the rounds, which assumed that the father still lived while the daughter reigned. Thus, "Indira is in the Prime Minister's house, and Jawaharlal is back to writing letters to her from jail again

Assassination in India: A Leader of Will and Force; Indira Gandhi, Born to Politics, Left Her Own Imprint on India By LINDA CHARLTON

Strong-willed, autocratic and determined to govern an almost ungovernable nation that seemed always in strife, Indira Gandhi was Prime Minister four times and the dominant figure in India for almost two decades.

She was born to politics and power, the granddaughter of Motilal Nehru, an early leader of the Indian independence movement, and daughter of Jawaharlal Nehru, who led India as Prime Minister in its first 17 years of independence from Britain.

Mrs. Gandhi served as her widowed father's official hostess, and after she moved into the position he once held, she became, behind her father and Mohandas K. Gandhi, the most commanding figure in modern Indian history. She was often accused of trying to build an Indian dynasty by planning to have her son Sanjay succeed her, and after his death in a plane crash in 1980 she was said to be arranging for her other son, Rajiv, to fill her role.

As Prime Minister, Mrs. Gandhi presided over the world's most populous democracy, a nation of 700 million people. During her tenure the Government made limited headway against such age-old Indian problems as overpopulation, hunger, caste, inadequate sanitation and chronic religious strife among the majority Hindus, Moslems and other sects.

Her years in power were turbulent, coming to a climax last June in a violent showdown with the minority Sikhs, when Mrs. Gandhi ordered Indian Army troops to attack the Golden Temple, the Sikhs' holiest place of worship, at Amritsar in the northern state of Punjab.

A Decisive Leader

But until her assassination yesterday in New Delhi, Mrs. Gandhi served as a decisive - some said dictatorial - leader.

She led India into the nuclear age when, in 1974, scientists there exploded an underground nuclear device, and she also took her nation into the space age, in 1980, when it launched its own satellite on its own rocket. This year, through her efforts, an Indian astronaut flew in a Soviet spacecraft.
In 1971, Mrs. Gandhi insured that her nation would become the dominant power on the subcontinent when India defeated Pakistan in an 11- month war and insured the creation of Bangladesh from what had been East Pakistan.

On the international scene, relations with the United States, which provided billions of dollars in aid from the 1950's to the 1980's, were sour and tense during much of her tenure. Her overall foreign policy, she maintained, was not biased in one direction or another, only ''pro-Indian,'' and she was a leader of the group of nations professing nonalignment. Indian critics said, however, that she kept India locked into a rigid position, leaning toward Moscow to an extent that was clearly difficult and embarrassing during the Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan.

Her friendship with the Soviet Union enabled her Government to build a powerful, well-equipped army.

In Nehru's Shadow

She grew up in the shadow of her father and stunned almost everyone by her emergence as a tough, shrewd and ruthless woman of commanding presence and absolute will. She maintained for many years that power did not interest her.

''I like being Prime Minister, yes, but not more than I liked the other jobs I have done in my life,'' she said in 1973. ''I am not ambitious. I don't care for honors.'' That was two years before she briskly assumed dictatorial powers, in response to what seemed a threat to her strength, and espoused the tenets of authoritarian rule, from suspension of civil liberties to censorship of the press. Then, demonstrating that India's familiar label as the world's largest democracy was not just a cliche, the voters of India swept her out of office and, 18 months later, voted her back into power again.
Her critics charged that her promises to erase poverty were quixotic and that India's chronic and severe social problems actually burgeoned during her years of power. They said, too, that she tolerated corrupt ministers and fostered corruption in her younger son, Sanjay; that she was hungry for power and surrounded herself with inept advisers rather than brook potential rivals. Empty ''sloganizing'' and indecision, they said, had bred cynicism.

Reins of Autocracy

Until June 1975, it seemed that Mrs. Gandhi's central achievement was her adherence to cementing democracy - an achievement that ultimately ripped the reins of autocracy from her hands. She was successful in reasserting, sometimes forcefully, the dominance of the central Government over states that seemed to be squabbling perennially with each other. She also made clear her abhorrence of the religious tensions that continue in India. She repeatedly sought to blunt communalism in the nation and made clear her detestation of the Hindu nationalists who exploited anti-Moslem feelings.

As a private person, Mrs. Gandhi seemed aloof, chilly, complex, giving no clue in her withdrawn, quiet personality as to why her public figure should appeal as it did to many millions of Indians. She could be rude, sometimes opening letters and signing papers when foreigners visited her in the red sandstone Indian Parliament or the nearby South Block of the secretariat.

In 1967, for example, when Richard M. Nixon, then a private citizen, visited her in New Delhi, Mrs. Gandhi barely concealed her boredom, and after 20 minutes of chatting she asked the Foreign Ministry official escorting Mr. Nixon how much longer the visit would last. The question was in Hindi, but its purport was clear to Mr. Nixon. During interviews, she would sometimes simply ignore questions that she did not wish to answer, lapsing into silences, doodling on a notepad and smiling vaguely.

At other times, she gave the impression of shyness and vulnerability. She was physically frail. She had suffered from tuberculosis, low blood pressure, kidney problems and muscle spasms in the neck and had ignored doctors' orders not to have children. She worked 14 hours a day and seemed lonely and isolated.

''I think the only reason I'm able to survive this with equanimity is that I'm just myself, regardless of the situation in the country,'' she once said. ''I know the condition of the people. There's nothing I can see that I don't know about already. It's not that you don't feel it, but - it's like a nurse and illness. You see it in perspective.''

'A Certain Instinct'

One of the most detailed and widely discussed criticisms of Mrs. Gandhi in the years before her takeover of the Government came in 1974 from G. B. Verghese, a former press adviser to the Prime Minister and the widely respected editor of The Hindustan Times. Mr. Verghese called her ''strangely paralyzed, unwilling to lead, afraid of her own majority.''

''The Prime Minister has no program, no world view, no grand design,'' he said. ''Thus, bereft of a frame, she has largely reacted to events and failed to shape them. This has been her tragedy. She lacks economic and administrative expertise. Nevertheless, she has a certain political instinct and charisma which would have been the greater assets if harnessed to a greater purpose. She has a mandate but no mission.''

Mrs. Gandhi herself often expressed her goals in sweeping and inoffensive terms: ''I am a politician in the sense that I want a particular kind of India, an India without poverty, without injustice, an India free of any foreign influence.'' Mr. Verghese and other critics said that, even backed with a great election victory and the success of the 1971 war with Pakistan, Mrs. Gandhi lacked specific goals.
She failed to define ''any larger, long-term objective of reconstructing India or the subcontinent,'' Mr. Verghese said. ''The greater the success, the greater the bewilderment over what to do. Having emblazoned 'Garibi Hatao' (Abolish Poverty) on her standard, she did not conceptualize it and carry it forward. She was quite unable to ride the crest of the wave.'' Nor, to be fair, had any of her critics had any greater success in meeting India's chronic crises or solving its perennial problems.

Unconcealed Anger

Mrs. Gandhi did not conceal her anger at these attacks. ''This is one of the countries in the world where the economy, although under severe strain, is not collapsing,'' she said to a journalist in 1974. ''Do you think it is easy to keep a country like India united? You say promises are not kept. I assert with all authority: Who in the world has kept more promises?''

However vague her destinations may have seemed, Mrs. Gandhi was always clear about her conviction that she was meant to lead India. She rarely indulged in self-analysis and usually brushed aside questions about her failed marriage, her personal life, her possibly difficult role as the daughter of the nation's first Prime Minister.

''Every position has advantages and disadvantages,'' she once observed. ''I had an advantage because of the education my father gave me and the opportunities of meeting some great people, not only politicians, but also writers, artists and so on. But in politics one has to work doubly hard to show one is not merely a daughter but is also a person in her own right.''

She added, ''Of course, being a woman you have to work twice as hard as a man.''
Once, when a visiting journalist asked her to describe Indira Gandhi, the woman, the Prime Minister said: ''In spite of always living in the public glare, she has remained a very private person. Her life has been hard. This has made her self-reliant but has not hardened her.''

A Lonely Childhood
Indira Priyadarshini (the second name means ''Dearly Beloved'') was born Nov. 19, 1917, the only child of Jawaharlal Nehru and his wife, Kamala, in Allahabad in northern India. Her grandfather, Motilal Nehru, who owned the house in which they lived, was a brilliant lawyer who discarded a lucrative practice to ally himself with Mohandas K. Gandhi and the Congress Party in the independence movement.

By all accounts, the child's early years were painfully lonely. The house served as a headquarters for the freedom struggle; her parents were frequently taken off to jail; the police were constantly there.
''My public life started at the age of 3,'' she said. ''I have no recollection of games, children's parties or playing with other children. My favorite occupation as a very small child was to deliver thunderous speeches to the servants, standing on a high table. All my games were political ones - I was, like Joan of Arc, perpetually being burned at the stake.

''I was very headstrong. The whole house was always in a state of tension that nobody had a normal life. There were police raids, arrests and so on, the physical and mental strain. And all the time it was in public.''

What made her childhood even more difficult was the contemptuous treatment given her mother, Kamala, by the far more Westernized and sophisticated women of the Nehru family. Mrs. Gandhi in later life indicated that her own fluency in Hindi, far better than her father's, and her ''Indianness,'' or ability to think and feel as a Hindu Indian, were largely a legacy of her mother. When asked once about the impact of Kamala Nehru on her personality, Mrs. Gandhi replied, ''I saw her being hurt and I was determined not to be hurt.''

Letters From Her Father

In her turbulent childhood - erratic schooling in India and Switzerland, followed by involvement in the independence struggle as a courier and demonstrator - she knew her father chiefly through the famous letters he wrote from a succession of prison cells. The letters, now collected, gave a capsule history of the world from Buddha to Stanley Baldwin and forged a strong link between father and daughter.

''They were the only companionship I had with my father,'' she recalled. ''That is why I valued them so much.''

Although Nehru was in and out of prison and traveling constantly, his link with his daughter strengthened. ''Nehru was constantly pointing out to the girl the fascinating world around them,'' wrote the journalist Krishan Bhatia, author of ''Indira,'' a biography of Mrs. Gandhi.

Her formal schooling remained sporadic; she spent three unhappy years at a formal boarding school in Poona and in 1934 went to the university at Santiniketan (Abode of Peace) in West Bengal, founded by Rabindranath Tagore, the Nobel Prize-winning poet and philosopher. It was a brief, almost idyllic experience for the young woman in the unconventional school, where she studied poetry and the Manipuri style of classical Indian dancing. ''In a way,'' she recalled, ''Tagore was the first person whom I consciously regarded as a great man.'' She said that the evenings spent sitting at his feet, talking or watching him paint, were ''moments of serene joy, memories to cherish.''

A British Education

Kamala Nehru died the following year. In 1937, Indira enrolled at Somerville College, Oxford, where she studied public and social administration, history and anthropology. Although she was in poor condition physically - she was ordered to spend several months in Switzerland to recover from pleurisy - Indira was active in the student wing of the British Labor Party and enrolled as a Red Cross volunteer when World War II began, even working briefly as an ambulance driver in the blitz.

In 1941, however, with the Indian independence movement nearing an apparent confrontation with the British, she sailed home with Feroze Gandhi, a newspaperman from Allahabad, who had worked in the Congress movement. He was a childhood friend of Indira, but her family was shocked when she announced, on arriving home, that she and Mr. Gandhi - who was not related to Mohandas Gandhi - planned to marry.

''Nobody wanted that marriage, nobody,'' she recalled many years later. Mr. Gandhi was of a different religion; she was a Hindu, he was a Parsee, which meant that ''the whole of India was against us.'' But she and Feroze Gandhi were married in March 1942. By September of that year, they were both sent to prison by the British. In fact, the only real domestic period of their troubled marriage was between 1943 and 1946, when they lived in relative quiet in Allahabad. A son, Ranjiv, was born in 1944, and another, Sanjay, in 1946.

That year Nehru became Prime Minister of a provisional Government as a prelude to full Indian independence, and Mrs. Gandhi became his official hostess. He enjoyed parties and travel; Mrs. Gandhi was dutiful, almost reluctant. Later, she recalled that she had disliked socializing and making small talk. ''It took me a long time to get over this. But I had to learn to enjoy it, so I did.'' She also said later that she had ''hated'' serving as hostess and once confessed that the crowds, noise, conflict and lack of privacy that marked so much of her life evoked ''considerable bitterness in me.''

She was so constantly with her father that, in the recollection of one Indian journalist, few even noticed her. As she grew closer to her father, and his demands on her grew with his prominence, the Gandhi marriage crumbled and the couple began to live apart. Feroze Gandhi went on to become an outspoken member of Parliament; he died in 1960.

An Inescapable Calling

Despite her shyness, and the fact that most politicians, diplomats and journalists viewed her only as Nehru's daughter, Mrs. Gandhi felt almost obligated to play a political role in India. ''She knew that politics was something she could not escape,'' a friend said in 1966, when Mrs. Gandhi first became Prime Minister. ''As a Nehru, she felt it was her destiny. She feels her background gives her a mission she must carry out.''

As her father's confidante and companion, Mrs. Gandhi traveled at his side abroad and at home and became a familiar, if somewhat diffident, figure to millions of Indians. Her first step toward national stature was in 1955, when she was elected to the 21- member Congress Party working committee. It was a small step, and she remained withdrawn and self- conscious, but it marked her first move toward an independent political identity.

Four years later, she was named president of the party, obviously because she was the daughter of Nehru, then at the peak of his power. Yet she herself, then 42 years old, was beginning to emerge as a favorite of the impatient younger members of the party, which was dominated by aging men linked only by the bond of having fought together against the British during India's long struggle for independence.

Signs of Toughness

During her 11 months as president, she began to display toughness and political assertiveness. She was influential in the ouster of the Communist government in the southern state of Kerala. Six months later, in state elections, she shocked many moderate supporters when she successfully allied Congress with the Muslim League, a sectarian group abhorred by Congress's leaders.

Despite her success, she turned down the offer of another term, partly because of concern about her father's health and partly because she realized that she was not yet senior enough to run the party as she wanted.

In May 1964 Nehru died of a stroke. Mrs. Gandhi went into a period of silent withdrawal for weeks, tending to burst into tears whenever a friend tried to offer condolences. Lal Bahadur Shastri, the new Prime Minister, offered Mrs. Gandhi a Cabinet post; she chose the relatively unprestigious job of Minister of Information and Broadcasting and did a lackluster job.

But in 1966, when Mr. Shastri died suddenly, the Congress Party's leaders chose Mrs. Gandhi as Prime Minister. There were two key reasons: First, they felt that she would be pliable, and second, they wished to avoid the obvious choice, Morarji R. Desai, whose career would be intertwined with that of Mrs. Gandhi years later.

The New Prime Minister

Her first year of leadership was one of uncertainty, although she did make some strong moves, such as dividing Punjab and proposing that the commercial banks be nationalized, which was achieved in 1969. In 1967 India's 250 million voters returned the Congress Party to power by a narrow margin; the economy had sunk into a deep recession and the failure of the monsoon for the second consecutive year threatened millions in northeast India with starvation, which was averted by American grain shipments.

Mrs. Gandhi was jolted by the election results, although she had found, to her surprise, that campaigning buoyed her. The closeness of the election made it clear to her that she was the only nationally known and accepted leader for a party that needed streamlining. She promptly announced a 10-point program to bring about a socialist state with a stable economy.

Congress became a divided party, with an older group forming around Mr. Desai and a younger, more radical faction gathering around Mrs. Gandhi. As the party breach widened, India's President, Zakir Husain, died suddenly in May 1969. Although the position was one of a figurehead, the vacancy set the stage for a struggle for control of the party.

The party's elders saw a chance to humiliate Mrs. Gandhi by supporting a candidate who was a known foe. Mrs. Gandhi, gathering her supporters, backed another candidate, thus asking members of her own party to vote with her against their leadership. With the help of nearly two- thirds of the Congress members, her candidate won a narrow victory. It is believed likely that she knowingly precipitated the crisis by dismissing Mr. Desai as Deputy Prime Minister.

The Old Guard Reacts

A few months later, the old guard leadership expelled Mrs. Gandhi from the party for ''grave acts of indiscipline.'' She brushed aside the gesture with characteristic contempt, calling it an illegal act by a group of discredited ''bosses'' and ''dictators'' who wanted to block her socialist programs. The next morning, the Congress Party bloc in Parliament gave her a vote of confidence.

With the party split and Mrs. Gandhi maintaining her populist stance, moving to nationalize the banks and eliminate the funds given to princely states, she abruptly called for elections in March 1971, a year ahead of schedule. She hoped to be able to increase her support, as the party split had left her with the backing of only a little more than 200 in the lower house of 525 members. After a 43-day campaign, Mrs. Gandhi emerged with a parliamentary victory of dimensions comparable to those of her father, with her wing of the party winning 350 seats.

When civil war broke out that year in Pakistan, India supported East Pakistan in its fight against West Pakistan and was quickly victorious. East Pakistan became Bangladesh and India became indisputably the dominant power on the Subcontinent. Three months after the end of the war, Mrs. Gandhi cemented her power more strongly, with the capture of 70 percent of the state assembly seats in regional elections. She had reached the peak of success.

Two years later, her popularity had plummeted. Her Government faced an economic crisis. Compounding the nation's misery were two severe droughts, inflation, oil-price increases in which she consistently defended the oil producers because they were ''exploited'' by Western nations, and poor planning, with development enmeshed in a web of bureaucracy.

Charges of Corruption

Her critics charged, moreover, that she had worsened the problems by misuse of authority, corruption and an erosion of moral leadership. She began to take steps that stirred uneasiness about her final intentions - using emergency measures to imprison strikers and dissident students without trial, taking over the small Himalayan protectorate of Sikkim.

''There has never been any advice spoken to me that I needed much,'' she once said. ''What influenced me more were the lives of the people I lived with - my mother and my father. That didn't need words.''

Mrs. Gandhi denied repeatedly that she was a mere politician - indeed, she was reportedly even allergic to those two staples of political campaigning in her country, the perpetual dust and the wreaths of marigolds - and saw herself rather as the inevitable destined leader of India. This gave her an armor of disdain against the growing attacks of the opposition, and, it proved in mid-June 1975, fostered the impulses of an autocrat.

Roots of a Crisis

The crisis began with the decision of a high court judge in Mrs. Gandhi's native Allahabad convicting her of two counts of electoral corruption - the specific charges included the use in her election campaign of the services of a Government official and of a rostrum - and declared her election to Parliament invalid. The ruling questioned her right to remain as Prime Minister and prohibited her from running in any election for six years. Not surprisingly, the opposition seized upon the ruling; despite her decision to appeal to a higher court, there was an immediate clamor for her to resign right away.

But she said there was ''no question'' of resignation. Instead, at dawn two days later, dozens of opposition leaders, including Mr. Desai, the Deputy Prime Minister, were arrested and taken to jail, and Mrs. Gandhi proclaimed a state of emergency. Acting under a law that was a holdover from British rule, the Maintenance of Internal Security Act, which bestowed sweeping and arbitrary powers on the Government, Mrs. Gandhi had first hundreds and then thousands of people arrested.
Soon domestic critics and foreign observers were proclaiming that democracy was dead. India's equivalent of the bill of rights was suspended; the press was sharply censored; thousands were jailed incommunicado and without the right to know the charges against them; judicial review of Government acts was severely limited. Constitutional guarantees of civil rights were suspended, as was habeas corpus.

As her powers expanded, Mrs. Gandhi serenely ignored the protests, including demonstrations in which several people were killed. ''In India,'' she said, ''democracy has given too much license to people. Even today we are more democratic than any developing country in the world.''

'Threat to Stability'

Mrs. Gandhi, in this first statement after embarking on her authoritarian program, said she had taken the action in response to a ''threat to internal stability'' and hoped that it would be only temporary. At the same time, she outlined a program of economic changes that she said were designed to bring down prices and achieve a more equitable distribution of land. Critics said that the changes were in fact designed primarily to distract attention from what seemed to be a rapid movement toward a totalitarian state. Other critics, economists, saw the planned ''reforms'' as a patchwork of dubious value.

Meanwhile, Mrs. Gandhi moved quickly to consolidate her hold. Her Congress Party, which had a majority in Parliament, ratified the state of emergency. Her powers were expanded, with amendments to the Maintenance of Internal Security Act, including one that allowed the Government to seize the property of people who were detained or went into hiding to avoid detention. The opposition condemned her assumption of emergency powers when Parliament opened, but the opposition was increasingly the minority.

Less than two months after Mrs. Gandhi assumed her new powers, more than 50,000 people were reportedly imprisoned, and Parliament changed the law under which she had been convicted in June. Another bill was passed that prevented her election from even being considered by the judiciary. In a speech on Aug. 15, 1975, the anniversary of India's independence, she said, ''Sometimes bitter medicine has to be administered to a patient only to cure him.'' A few days later, she took aim at external criticism of her actions, saying that unnamed ''casual critics'' applied ''special standards'' to India's behavior.

Rewriting the Law

In November, the Supreme Court dismissed the charges against Mrs. Gandhi, basing its ruling on the law passed about two months after her conviction that rewrote the election law so as to omit the offenses of which she had been found guilty. Few were surprised when at the end of December, the Congress Party announced that the elections scheduled for early 1976 had been postponed for a year ''in order to insure continuity in bringing about economic and political stability.' She continued to deny that she had set the country on a course toward totalitarianism. ''Would you be here at all, if we were totalitarian?'' she asked her opposition in Parliament early in 1976, a rhetorical device that ignored that many members of the opposition were not there but in jail. Justifying the imposition of the state of emergency, and its broadening scope, she said: ''Democracy is a value we cherish. If we have these curbs today, it is because democracy was in danger. A handful of people were trying to stop the functioning of the will of the majority.''

The shrunken opposition was unconvinced. India, said one opponent, had entered ''an era of darkness.''

Mrs. Gandhi, defending the Government's decision to postpone the elections for a year, said: ''If we held the elections now, we would win. But that is not the point. The point is whether we have greater unity or whether we let loose forces of disruption so that the whole fabric falls apart.''
It was an argument that sounded to many like nothing more than a justification for what was rapidly becoming a classic dictatorship. The next conference of her Congress Party, however, predictably called for the continuation of the state of emergency, and in February 1976 an obedient Parliament passed legislation giving the Government the power to suppress ''objectionable material'' in the press.

Changes in Foreign Policy

In foreign affairs, however, there were signs of change, of flexibility. The United States broke off scheduled talks on the resumption of economic aid to indicate displeasure with the continuing policies of repression, but by late April 1976, American diplomats were talking of vague signs of a ''thaw'' in the Government's attitude toward the United States. In the same year, she ended 15 years of coldness between India and China when she sent an Ambassador to Peking.

Meanwhile, the Government announced that it was sending an ambassador to China for the first time in 15 years, and as a further sign of a new amiability, proposed renewing talks with Pakistan with an eye to normalization of relations. Mrs. Gandhi went to the Soviet Union for a five-day visit after signing a new five- year agreement with Moscow that stressed commercial ties between the two countries.

Domestically, there was no thaw, and Mrs. Gandhi showed no signs of qualms. In June 1976 the Government extended for one year its right to hold prisoners without trial or even formal charges, a step it said was taken ''for dealing with the emergency.'' India's Supreme Court, meanwhile, had upheld the Government's right to imprison political opponents without hearings. Not content, Mrs. Gandhi proposed in August further constitutional amendments that would give the executive branch, meaning herself, almost unlimited powers.

Perhaps as a sign of security, the Government allowed opponents to hold meetings to protest these changes in the country's Constitution, which they saw as basically codifying the state of emergency. Predictably, however, the amendments were approved by Parliament.

Population Control

One significant domestic issue for Mrs. Gandhi was population control, particularly the question of compulsory sterilization, which was debated in Parliament throughout 1976. She announced that ''strong steps which may not be liked by all'' were under consideration, the sterilization program was pushed and the Government, in September, announced that civil servants were to be prohibited from having more than three children. This renewed emphasis on population control, along with rumors of compulsory sterilization, provoked sometimes violent protests and confrontation. But India in 1976 had the best birth control record in its history.

Once again, as the year neared an end, the Government announced that the scheduled elections had been postponed until early 1978, But in early January 1977, Mrs. Gandhi, in a surprise announcement, told the country that elections would be held in March because of her ''unshakable faith'' in the power of the people. It was believed that she was motivated by a certainty that the Congress Party would win easily, as it had won every election since independence. Another strong motive was believed to be a desire to take advantage of a better economic position and to improve India's position abroad. Shortly afterward, Mrs. Gandhi released the last of the political opponents still being held.

Her campaign theme was that ''only a strong central government can build a stronger India.'' She offered the closest thing to an apology for the stringencies she had imposed, saying, ''We didn't want to cause hardship to anybody but no government would have tolerated the threats, the violence, the assault on democracy that we faced.'' Her oppposition, she asserted, had only one issue, herself. The rapid advancement of her beloved younger son, Sanjay, also became an issue; he had been named to the executive committee of Congress's youth branch at the end of 1975.

Rejection at the Polls

The opposition to Mrs. Gandhi had a single theme, expressed by one banner as ''End Dictatorship, Dethrone the Queen.'' On March 20, 1977, the voters did just that, defeating Mrs. Gandhi and making Mr. Desai, whom she had imprisoned two years before, Prime Minister. Mr. Desai headed the Janata Party, the dominant factor in the loose anti-Congress coalition.

Not for two days after the election results were announced did Mrs. Gandhi leave her residence to go to the presidential palace and hand in her resignation. She said in her resignation speech that ''elections are part of the democratic process to which we are deeply committed.'' She also pledged to continue her aim of serving the people to the ''limit of my endurance.''

The new Government announced that its victory was a clear verdict ''against executive arbitrariness'' and began to dismantle the apparatus of legislative repression. In foreign relations, too, there was a sharp turn from Mrs. Gandhi's tilt toward Moscow. ''We do not want any special relations with any country,'' Mr. Desai announced.

The Desai Government set up an investigative commission to look into the imposition of emergency rule, but Mrs. Gandhi declined to appear before it. ''The proclamation of emergency,'' she said, ''was a constitutional step, approved by the Cabinet and duly ratified by both houses of Parliament.'' She said that because of ''retrograde, communal and capitalistic forces'' trying to subvert her Government, she had been forced to proclaim the emergency to ''stem the impending disaster.''

A Personal Triumph
In October 1977, after being rebuffed in her efforts to reclaim the leadership of the Congress Party, Mrs. Gandhi was arrested on charges of official corruption. After a few hours in jail - she refused bail - she was ordered released by a magistrate who found no reasonable grounds for her detention. Turning the episode into a personal triumph, she immediately went on a three-day tour of western India; in Bombay, about 25,000 people turned out to greet her.

Her arrest, she proclaimed, was ''to prevent me from going to the people,'' adding, ''It is an attempt to discredit me in their eyes and the eyes of the world.''

Now she openly sought a return to power. When a cyclone struck India's east coast, she flew there, saying, ''I want to share the people's sorrow.'' She and local political officials avoided each other as they raced around the flooded areas and through refugee camps.

In early 1978, Mrs. Gandhi and her supporters broke away from the regular Congress Party and formed what was known as the Congress-I (for Indira) Party, or to its adherents, the ''real Congress'' party. Any reunion of the two factions, Mrs. Gandhi said, must be headed by her. Once again, as she campaigned through February in state election campaigns, huge crowds gathered. She herself won a by-election in a rural South Indian district later in the year.

A Long Battle
Her battle not to testify before the investigative commission, and not to be tried for refusing to testify, dragged through the year. ''I repeat that the commission is not legally competent to require that I should bind myself by taking an oath,'' she said in refusing once again, despite two contempt charges. In May 1978, the commission concluded that the state of emergency had been declared fraudulently and administered arbitrarily. During the summer, the Government charged her with having illegally detained opposition leaders and harassed officials during the emergency. Her son Sanjay was charged with having engaged in illegal demolition of private property.

Her response was simple: ''Instead of solving the problems of the people, they are trying to divert attention.''

In December 1978, the Government acted to charge her with harassing four Government officials who had been investiating Maruti Ltd., the automobile company set up by Sanjay Gandhi. She denied the charges in Parliament with her usual chill serenity, saying: ''Every man, woman and child in India knows that if the drama of a kind of impeachment of a former Prime Minister is enacted, its sole purpose is not to solve any national problem, but to silence a voice which they find inconvenient.''
As the vote in Parliament neared, riots exploded in several cities. After a seven-day debate, the vote on Prime Minister Desai's motion that she be expelled and jailed for the remainder of the session was 279 to 138. In a typical gesture of disdain, Mrs. Gandhi refused to leave the Parliament chamber and to go home ''to be arrested in the dead of night from my house,'' as so many of her opponents had been.

A Dramatic Gesture

She insisted on waiting to be arrested in Parliament, and it was three hours before the arresting officers arrived. As they came she got up on a heavy table to offer friends the characteristic Hindu salutation, ''namaste,'' an inclination of the head over hands placed as if in prayer. Then she was led off.

Public response made it clear that she was, with all her faults, still a considerable and revered national figure. Several thousand of her supporters were arrested in clashes with the police, and several people were killed. An airliner was hijacked to protest her imprisonment. She was released when the parliamentary session ended a few days later. ''I had a good rest,'' she said.

Through the early months of 1979, her fortunes seemed at an ebb, as pressure grew for investigations into various allegations made against her and Sanjay. The Congress Party was reunited, with its recently disaffected members, the Congress-I faction, merging again with the others. She said, uncharacteristically, that perhaps she had made mistakes and expressed regrets for ''hardships and inconvenience caused.'' Special courts were set up for her trials.

But the coalition against Mrs. Gandhi was crumbling under the weight of its failure to resolve India's chronic crises and even more from internal politics, with Mr. Desai badly undermined by Charan Singh.

Divide and Conquer

In July 1979 Prime Minister Desai resigned. Repeating her brilliant 1969 divide-and-conquer victory, Mrs. Gandhi threw her vital support behind Mr. Singh, another man she had once had thrown into prison, as Mr. Desai's successor. At about the same time, a survey showed her to be the single most popular political figure in India's major cities.

Just as she had more or less created the Singh Government, so she destroyed it by making it clear that she and her followers would oppose a motion of confidence, possibly because Mr. Singh refused to dismiss the charges of corruption pending against her. Shortly after his Government fell, he returned as a caretaker Prime Minister until elections could be held in three months. When asked if in the interim he would be ruling at her pleasure, Mrs. Gandhi replied, ''Yes, or he won't rule at all.''
With elections ahead, she worked hard making sure that she was returned to power, campaigning vigorously, forging alliances. In the elections of January 1980, she and her Congress-I Party won a sweeping victory, winning two-thirds of the seats in Parliament.

''I don't want to be in power,'' she said in an interview just before the elections, going on to contradict herself by hinting strongly that she had been running things all along: ''Maybe (the Janata Party) made Government policy, but I was at the center of Indian politics. I was the main issue of discussion at every Cabinet meeting.'' And when the returns were in, she said that victory had been won ''entirely on my name.''

One of the first major issues she had to deal with was the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. Her position changed several times, sometimes from day to day. But by the end of January, Mrs. Gandhi was saying, ''What happened in Afghanistan is an internal matter of that country.'' An official communique issued after she met with the Soviet Foreign Minister, Andrei A. Gromyko, said only that both sides agreed ''to consider measures by which tensions can be defused in consultation with each other.''

The Loss of a Son

Early in 1980, two cases pending against Mrs. Gandhi in special courts were canceled on technical grounds. Her power seemed secure, barely ruffled by growing murmurs that her younger son, Sanjay, was misbehaving. In June 1980, however, Sanjay - her open favorite - was killed in the crash of a small plane. Her control did not break, but few doubted that his death was a severe blow to the Prime Minister.

In the years since Sanjay's death, his brother, Rajiv, emerged as their mother's chief political lieutenant, culminating in his being named Prime Minister yesterday. Now 40 years old and a former airline pilot, he was the first among five general secretaries of the Congress-I Party.

Prickly Relations

Mrs. Gandhi's relations with opposition leaders continued to be prickly at best. In the last year Congress-I tried to topple several state governments hostile to it and to the Prime Minister. Last July in Kashmir, Mrs. Gandhi's forces succeeded in splitting the National Conference Party, enabling a coalition of National Conference defectors and Congress-I members to assume control of the state government.

In Andhra Pradesh near the southern tip of the subcontinent, Mrs. Gandhi's allies appeared to have engineered the ouster in August of the state's Chief Minister, N. T. Rama Rao, a highly popular opponent of the Prime Minister. She denied any role in Mr. Rama Rao's removal, which was ordered by a Gandhi-appointed governor. After nationwide protests charging undemocratic practices, a new governor, also named by Mrs. Gandhi, reversed his predecessor's action, and Mr. Rama Rao was permitted to form a new cabinet.

In yet another state, Karnataka, which borders Andhra Pradesh, Congress-I officials were charged with using bribes to lure opposition legislators to defect. But leaders of the Janata Party quickly called for a vote of confidence and won it.

As of this fall, Mrs. Gandhi could count all but four of India's 22 state govenments in her camp, giving her a strong advantage in a national election.

The Sikh Rebellion

Criticism of her tactics against opposition parties had been balanced by popular approval of her swift action last June to quell an outbreak by Sikh terrorists in the northern state of Punjab.

That rebellion came to a bloody climax last June, when Mrs. Gandhi sent Indian troops to storm the Golden Temple in Amritsar, the holiest shrine of the Sikh religion. After 36 hours of fierce fighting between militant Sikhs and the soldiers, the 72- acre temple complex was strewn with bodies.
According to official Government figures, about 600 people were killed in the raid on the temple, including the most militant Sikh leader, Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale. Other reports placed the figure as high as 1,200.

A Force for Unity

After the rebellion, Mrs. Gandhi remained, in the minds of many voters, a strong personal force for national unity. Earlier this year a poll by The Illustrated Weekly found 94 percent of the respondents rating her as an able national leader.

She was also a leader on the international level, becoming chairman of the movement of nations professing nonalignment after a summit meeting in New Delhi in March 1983.

Her stormy political life found an echo in her family relations in the last few years. In 1982 Sanjay Gandhi's widow, Maneka, was evicted from the Prime Minister's house, where she had been living since her marriage. Indira Gandhi, according to family intimates, had opposed the marriage from the beginning.

The feud intensified in July when Maneka announced that she would run against her brother-in-law, Rajiv, for his parliamentary seat from a constituency in Uttar Pradesh, the district that Sanjay had represented before his death.

As the time neared when the Prime Minister would have to set a date for the election, speculation arose that Mrs. Gandhi might seek to postpone a vote if she felt she was not assured of victory